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California Corporate Securities Law
Of 1968: Some Interpretations,
Some Problem Areas
WMLLIAM R. BICKFORD*
The California Corporate Securities Act of 1968 was a significant
and innovative extention of State power over the general area of
securities transactions. In the few years since its enactment it is
evident that prudent application of the Act to legal problems re-
quires a comprehensive understanding of certain key provisions.
The author's contribution is intended to provide enlightenment re-
garding the interrelationship of the significant sections of the Act
as they have been interpreted and applied in practice. This ex-
pertise is, in part, derived from many years of experience in the
positions of Corporations Counsel for the State Department of Cor-
porations. In this article the author focuses his attention on juris-
dictional problems regarding the sale of securities, nonpublic and
exempt transactions, "secondary trades," options which constitute
sales, and liabilities for violation of the Act.
California's new Corporate Securities Law of 1968 became effective
on January 2, 1969.' Although the law has received wide publicity,
there have been some legislative as well as rule changes and interpre-
* B.A. 1957, LL.B. 1960, University of California, Berkeley; Senior Corpo-
rations Counsel, Department of Corporations; Adjunct Professor of Law, McGeorge
School of Law, University of the Pacific; Member, California Bar. The opnons ex-
pressed herein are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commissioner of Corporations or the policy of the Department of Corporations.
1. CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 88 § 2, p. 243, operative January 2, 1969. The
Corporate Securities Law of 1917, CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 532, p. 673, was repealed by
CAL. STAT. 1968, c. 88 § 1, p. 243. The Corporate Securities Law of 1968 will be
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tations of the law by the Commissioner which have not been as widely
publicized. Some problem areas under the prior law continue to pre-
sent problems to the practicing attorney and certain areas of the new
law may offer pitfalls to the attorney who is not sufficiently familiar
with the entire regulatory scheme or with specialized aspects of securi-
ties law. The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the more
significant of these changes and interpretations and to discuss and offer
clarification of certain of the problem areas.
Outline of New Law Changes
The Corporate Securities Law of 1968 represents a major moderniz-
ation of the prior regulatory scheme shifting emphasis from areas which
experience shows require less regulation to those in which the prior
law did not provide adequate remedies or regulation.2 A major change
in the law is the addition of specific provisions relating to the jurisdic-
tional application of the statute.3 Also several new and significant
exemptions are created for certain securities and transactions which ei-
ther because of regulation by other agencies or because of limited dan-
ger to the public do not warrant regulation.4  The most important ex-
emptions are those for securities traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change and the small offering or close-corporation exemption.5 Non-
issuer transactions or "secondary trading" are, however, for the first time
subjected to regulation in California.6 The law adds detailed provisions
respecting civil liabilities and creates new statutory liabilities. 7  In ad-
dition, the Commissioner is given new authority to bring civil actions on
behalf of investors in certain circumstances.,
The new law contains three qualification sections instead of one as
under the prior law. 9 This distinction recognizes the conceptual dif-
ferences in these transactions. Direct issuer transactions are qualified
referred to herein as either the "new law" or the "1968 law." The 1917 law will be
referred to as the "prior law" or "prior statute."
2. The philosophical basis of the new law as well as the major changes in
California securities law effected by this legislation are discussed in Chapter One of the
text, H. MARCH AND R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SECURI-
Tis LAw OF 1968 (1969) [cited hereinafter as MARSH & VOLK]. This text, to which
frequent reference is made in this article, also provides a comprehensive and detailed
analysis of the new law as well as a comparison of provisions of the prior law and is
an excellent practice handbook. It is evident from the Draftsmen's Commentary to
the 1968 law which is published in Appendix A of MARSH & VOLK that the new law
is drawn from the Uniform Securities Act and the federal securities laws as well as
from the prior law.
3. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008.
4. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25100(o), 25102(h).
5. Id.
6. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25130.
7. CAL. CORP. CODE §H 25400-25510.
8. CAL. CORP. CODE 9H 25530, 25531.
9. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25110, 25120, 25130.
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under section 25110, recapitalizations and reorganizations under sec-
tion 25120 and nonissuer transactions under section 25130. There are
also three different methods of qualification for issuer transactions sub-
ject to section 25110: coordination, notification and permit.' 0 Co-
ordination and notification are shortened procedures applicable to cer-
tain transactions where substantial information has already been filed
under the federal statutes. The "fair, just and equitable" standard has
been retained in the new law; however, in respect to qualification by
coordination and notification the burden is shifted to the Commissioner
to find the transaction is not "fair, just and equitable.""
Another significant new provision is section 25700 which provides,
in part, that no provision of the law imposing any liability applies to
any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any written in-
terpretive opinion of the Commissioner. Section 25618 provides that
the Commissioner in his discretion may honor requests from any inter-
ested person for interpretive opinions.
Jurisdiction--'In this State"
The prior law at section 25500 provided that,
No company shall sell any security of its own issue,.., or offer for
sale, negotiate for the sale of, or take subscriptions for any such se-
curity, until it has first applied for and secured from the commis-
sioner a permit authorizing it so to do.'
2
The civil liability sections of that law provided at section 26100 that,
Every security of its own issue sold or issued by any company with-
out a permit of the commissioner then in effect authorizing the issu-
ance or sale of the security is void.' 3
Section 25003 defined "company" to include,
10. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25111, 25112, 25113.
11. Qualifications by coordination or notification under § 25111, 25112 and
25113 become effective automatically after having been on file with the Commissioner
for the period specified in the sections unless the Commissioner shall have first issued
a stop order pursuant to section 25140(a) denying effectiveness to (or after qualifi-
cation becomes effective, suspending or revoking the effectiveness of) such qualifica-
tion. Section 25140(a) authorizes the Commissioner to issue a stop order if he finds
that
the proposed plan of business of the issuer or the proposed issuance or sale of
securities is not fair, just or equitable or that the issuer does not intend to
transact its business fairly and honestly, or that the securities proposed to be
issued or the method to be used in issuing them will tend to work a fraud
upon the purchaser thereof. (Emphasis added).
12. CAL. STATs. 1949, c. 384, § 1, p. 707, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1574,
§ 1, p. 3398; CAL. STATs. 1963, c. 1593, § 1, p. 2172, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1968,
c. 88, § 1, p. 243.
13. CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 384, § 1, p. 720, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 88, § 1,
p. 243.
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All domestic and foreign private corporations, associations, syndi-
cates, joint stock companies, and partnerships of every kind.' 4
Thus it was clear that the statute was intended to apply to out-of-state
issuers. These sections, in combination with certain other provisions
of the statute, produced some anomalous results. Since the statute
voided every security "issued" by a company without a permit, it was
necessary that a company incorporated in California obtain a permit to
sell securities to nonresidents of California even though the corpora-
tion may not have had an office or any place of business in this state
and although the offer, acceptance and delivery-everything except the
"issuance"-took place outside California. Likewise a permit was
required before a California corporation could "issue" a share dividend,
although a permit was not required to authorize a foreign corporation
to issue a share dividend to its California shareholders.'5 And since
section 25009(a)16 defined a sale to include "any change in the rights,
preferences, privileges, or restrictions on outstanding securities, . . ."
foreign corporations were required to obtain a permit to solicit Cali-
fornia shareholders whenever the solicitation would affect the rights of
that class of stock. For example, a permit was required when the
solicitation was to authorize an amendment to articles creating a new
class of stock with a dividend or asset preference.' 7
On the other hand, since section 25500 did not expressly apply to a
sale by an underwriter as well as the issuer,'8 it was concluded that a
permit was not required to authorize the public distribution of securities
in California by underwriters who had made a firm commitment with
the issuer outside California to underwrite the entire issue. The ra-
tionale supporting this conclusion: the sale "by the issuer" had taken
place outside California and the underwriter was merely reselling out-
14. CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 384, § 1, p. 698, repealed, CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 88,
§ 1, p. 243.
15. In an opinion interpreting provisions of the California Insurance Code which
were "practically identical" to provisions of the Corporate Securities Law when en-
acted, the Attorney General of California said that a permit under the Insurance Code
was not required for a stock dividend of a foreign insurer where
the only act which occurs in the State of California in connection with this
transaction is the delivery of the certificates by United States mail to such of
its shareholders as are residents of California.
17 OP. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 217, 222 (1951).
16. CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 384, § 1, p. 689, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 388,
§ 1, p. 729.
17. See MAPSH & VOLK, supra note 2, at 11. See also 36 Op. CAL. A-r'Y GEN.
12 (1960) where section 25009(a) was interpreted to require a permit for even
technical changes where, for instance, by amendment to articles par value stock is
changed to no par stock without any change to stated capital. However, certain of
those purely technical changes were exempted from the requirement of a permit by a
1961 amendment to former section 25500. CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1574, § 1, p. 3398.
18. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 532, § 3, p. 675, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1931, c. 423,
§ 2, p. 941.
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standing securities in this state. 9
It appeared clear enough that the statute applied to offers and sales
made directly by foreign issuers to residents of this state (not through
underwriters who had purchased outside California). A review of
the cases under the prior law, however, reflects that the California courts
did not consider the statute so clear in respect to the question whether
the transaction was voidable by the buyer when some part of the sale
was concluded outside of this state. A leading case is Robbins v. Pa-
cific Eastern Corporation,20 decided by the California Supreme Court
in 1937. In that case one McKee, a director and shareholder of the
American Company (American), a California corporation, initiated ne-
gotiations in California with Taylor, a representative of a Delaware cor-
poration, Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation (Goldman Sachs), with
principal offices in New York, for an exchange of his shares of Ameri-
can for shares of Goldman Sachs. Goldman Sachs was only interested
in an exchange if it could acquire a majority of the outstanding stock
of American. Ensuing negotiations ultimately led to an offer from
Goldman Sachs addressed to the "shareholders" of American com-
municated to them by letter from McKee. The offer contemplated that
the American shareholders, substantially all of whom resided in Cali-
fornia, would deposit their shares with a California depositary (Ameri-
can Trust Company, an affiliate of American). After a majority of the
American shares had been deposited with American Trust Company in
California, McKee pointed out to Goldman Sachs that delivery of Gold-
man Sachs certificates to the California depositary might result in a sale
here requiring a permit. Consequently it was agreed that an officer of
American would hand carry the certificates for American shares to New
York for the physical exchange (later changed to New Jersey to avoid
New York transfer taxes). The Goldman Sachs shares, however, were
delivered in New York. In its opinion the court assumed that the offer
by Goldman Sachs was made in California and accepted here. It also
assumed that the Corporate Securities Act provisions in effect at that
time applied to negotiations or offers by a foreign corporation made
in this state, and that the executory contract formed by offer and ac-
ceptance in California was illegal. However, the court also found that a
proper interpretation of the agreement indicated that the parties in-
tended that title was to pass upon delivery of the Goldman Sachs shares.
The court determined that delivery was in New York, and since such
19. This was the conclusion of the Attorney General in an unpublished opinion to
the Commissioner dated July 15, 1940, Op. CAL. AT'ry GEN. 2780 (1940), on file at
the Commissioner's office.
20. 8 Cal. 2d 241 (1937).
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contracts were legal there, the contract was legal where performed. The
court concluded that performance of the contract in New York stood
independently of the prior illegality.-2
Professor Louis Loss, in a detailed discussion of conflict of laws
problems in Blue Sky Laws, pointed out in a 1957 Harvard Law Re-
view article22 that the situation in Robbins has been substantially re-
peated in several other cases involving the California Act. He noted,
however, that these holdings could not be divorced from the language
of the California statute which at that time applied only if a security
was "issued" without a permit or in contravention of the terms of a per-
mit.23 According to Loss, the California cases ". . . seem almost al-
ways, but not quite, to equate the 'issue' of shares by a foreign corpora-
tion outside of California with their delivery. '24  Loss suggested that
the result may be different, however, after the California courts had
an opportunity to construe the 1947 amendment to the California stat-
ute, making void any security "sold or issued" without a permit.21
Attorneys for plaintiff, a California resident, urged this proposition
in a recent case involving the application of the prior California statute
to an interstate transaction. The case, Robinson v. Cupples Container
Co.2 decided in September 1970, by the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, was before the court on motions by de-
fendants to dismiss on grounds that the amended complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Although the court's
opinion did not provide a detailed statement of the transaction relating
to the sale of securities, the court stated that, ". . . it is undisputed that,
although negotiations leading to the contract occurred in California,
the contract itself was performed and executed and the securities were
transferred in Clayton, Missouri."'2 7 Plaintiff argued that the Robbins
case dealt with the California Securities Law as it existed prior to 1947
(voiding every security "issued" by any company without a permit) 28
and that the case was overruled by the 1947 amendment to section
26100 which as amended provided that every security "sold or issued"
without a permit is void.29 Plaintiffs also pointed out that the prior law,
21. Id. at 277.
22. Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the Blue Sky Laws, 71 HArv. L. RE'V. 209
(1957).
23. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 532, § 12, p. 679, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1931, c. 423,
§ 15, p. 949; CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 898, § 5c, p. 2316.
24. Loss, supra note 22, at 230.
25. CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 384, § 1, p. 720.
26. 316 F. Supp. 1362 (1970).
27. Id. at 1367.
28. See note 23 supra.
29. See note 25 supra.
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in effect at the time of the Robbins decision, defined "sale" to include
any offer, attempt to sell or solicitation to sell within California.
The court rejected this argument, agreeing with defendants that the
1947 amendment was intended to make it clear a corporation could
not resell treasury shares without obtaining a permit (a resale of such
outstanding shares arguably not constituting an "issue"). The court
distinguished the case of Ogier v. Pacific Oil & Gas Development
Corp.3" on the rationale that the transaction at issue in that case was
wholly instrastate while in Robbins the activity involved the transactions
beyond the jurisdiction of the state. It concluded that the "place of per-
formance of an executory contract for the sale of securities is all im-
portant and that Robbins is still the law."'31
The 1968 law will effect changes in each of the results noted above.
The voiding provision has been eliminated entirely and liability will
result from the offer or sale without qualification with no reference to
issue.32  Therefore, qualification is no longer required where the
only contact with this state is corporate domicile. If securities of a
California corporation are offered and sold outside of California to
nonresidents, a permit is not required solely because of technical issu-
ance in California.33 This will bring relief in the situation where a for-
eign corporation or nonresident individuals acquire all of the stock of a
California corporation and move its office from California to the foreign
state. In the past a permit was required even if offers and sales were
made from the corporation's offices in the foreign state to residents of
that state. Section 25008(b) now provides that an offer is made in
this state and is subject to the permit requirement only if it originates
from this state, or is directed to, and received in this state. So, if in fact
an offer is sent from California, even though to a nonresident, qualifica-
tion is required unless some exemption is applicable.
The issuer qualification sections of the new law, sections 25110 and
25120, require qualification whether an offer or sale is directly by the
issuer or "by or through underwriters." Securities sold in this state by
underwriters are thus subject to qualification even though technically
the "sale" by the issuer occurs outside of California. California cor-
porations are no longer required to obtain a permit to "issue" a share
dividend as the statute no longer applies to an issuance which is not
also a sale and section 25019 excludes the ordinary share dividend from
30. 135 Cal. App. 2d 776 (1955).
31. 316 F. Supp. at 1368.
32. Former section 26100, which contained the voiding provision, was repealed
by CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 88, § 1, p. 243. It was not replaced. CAL. CoRP. CODE
§§25110, 25120, and 25130 now govern liability for unqualified issues.
33. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
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the definition of sale. Although the new statute also defines sale to in-
clude a change in rights, preferences and privileges on outstanding
shares,3 4 the burden on the foreign corporation with only a few share-
holders in this state is relieved by limiting the changes on outstanding
shares which require qualification to only those changes specified in
section 25103(e); and then only if the change will substantially and
adversely affect any class of shareholders; and finally such changes are
exempt unless the holders of at least 25 percent of the outstanding shares
of any class affected have addresses in this state according to the cor-
poration records. 35
Would the decision in the Robbins case be the same under the new
law? It appears not. The new law for the first time includes express
provisions relating to jurisdiction. The basic qualification sections of
the new law require qualification for offers and sales "in this state" and
this phrase is incorporated into the civil liability provisions by refer-
ence.3 6 Section 25008 sets forth a detailed definition of the phrase,
"in this state" providing in subsection (a) that an offer or sale is made
in this state when (1) an offer to sell is made in this state or (2) an
offer to buy is accepted in this state or (3) (if both the seller and the
purchaser are domiciled in this state) the security is delivered to the
purchaser in this state. Subsection (b) provides that an offer to sell
(or to buy) is made in this state when the offer either originates from
this state or is directed by the offeror to this state and received at the
place to which it is directed.
The statute as applied in Robbins, however, defined "sale" to include
an offer to sell or a solicitation of a saleT and the court conceded that
both an offer and acceptance, an executory contract, had been made in
California. The court did not expressly say it was looking for the place
of "issue" and the federal district court in the Robinson case suggests
that the "issue" language in the prior law was not the determinative fac-
tor in these cases. 38 On its face the Robbins opinion suggests that the
decision rests on the proposition that an entirely separate and new sale
was made outside of California. The court quoted with approval the
earlier state court holding in Moore v. Moffatt3 that the validity of a
sale when made is not affected by a prior illegal contract to make such
a sale.40
34. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25017(a).
35. CAL. CoRp. CODE § 25103(b)(c)(d).
36. CAL. Corn,. CODE §§ 25110, 25120, 25130, 25503.
37. CAL. STATs. 1917, c. 532, § 7, p. 674, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1929, c. 707,
§ 1, p. 1251.
38. 316 F. Supp. at 1367-1368.
39. 188 Cal. 1 (1922).
40. 8 Cal. 2d at 282.
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Moffatt involved the sale and issuance of shares pursuant to a permit
which was obtained after the parties had entered into an illegal subscrip-
tion agreement. That state court concluded that although the parties
could not "ratify" the prior invalid agreement, by adopting and accept-
ing the prior agreement after the permit was issued they had in effect
"embodied" it in a new agreement effected by the sale and issuance of
shares after the permit was obtained. 1 In Robbins the court likewise
found that a new agreement was effected by "performance and execu-
tion" of the contract by delivery in New York. The Robbins court was
apparently very troubled by the fact that it could find no fraud or im-
position by the sellers and that the buyers, apparently because of a
market decline, had merely made a bad bargain.
Could a court faced with a similar factual problem reach the same
conclusion under the new law despite its express provisions relating to
jurisdiction? The explicit language of the new law would seem to pre-
clude such a result. The Moffatt case reveals no facts to show a new
agreement and it appears that the court created a fiction to fit the
circumstances-not so objectionable perhaps in cases where in fact a
permit is obtained. Likewise, the court in Robbins does not mention
facts which would demonstrate that the parties concluded a new agree-
ment in New York. The facts given warrant the conclusion that de-
livery in that state was merely performance in accordance with the terms
of the initial agreement in California. It appears that the court by its
characterization of the transaction in terms of contract performance in
effect "transported" the sale to New York.
Section 25008 of the new law defines the "locus" of sale, not in terms
of place of performance or delivery (unless both parties are domiciled
in California) but place of offer. Since offer is defined in the securities
law sense and not in terms of contract law the ultimate factor is place of
solicitation.4 2 Therefore, the seller cannot manipulate the place of offer
by conditioning the offer or soliciting from the buyer an offer to buy
which must be accepted in the seller's state. This approach best serves
41. 188 Cal. at 6-7.
42. Section 25017(b) defines "offer" to include "every attempt or offer to
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy (a security)." However, in what appears
to be the first case relating to the jurisdiction provisions of the Uniform Securities Act,
a federal district court in Oklahoma refused to apply the securities law of California
even though the plaintiffs were solicited for sale in California. The facts indicated
that the offer originated in Oklahoma and was directed to the buyers in California so
that under the Oklahoma statute (which includes a provision substantially similar to
section 414 of the Uniform Securities Act) the law of both states should have applied.
The oil interests sold were not defined as securities under the Oklahoma statute,
however, and the court, without discussing the jurisdiction sections of the Oklahoma
statute, decided that this indicated a strong public policy of the state of Oklahoma that
sellers of these interests were not to be subject to securities regulation. See Gaillard
v. Field, 381 F.2d 25 (D.C. Okla. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968).
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the public policy underlying the California securities law, to protect
the buyer or investor in the purchase of securities. The holding in
Robbins and cases which have followed it would encourage sellers to
substitute their own standards for those provided by the securities law.
The California securities law, however, offers more than protection
against fraud. In some cases, for example, the detailed financial dis-
closure required upon qualification may forewarn the buyer of an ulti-
mate decline in the market value of the seller's stock.
It is also significant that the court in Robbins considered that ac-
ceptance of the buyer's argument would place sellers in a dilemma.
The court said,
(Appellant's argument) would lead to the conclusion that when-
ever a foreign corporation desired to sell some of its stock to Cali-
fornia residents, and, in California, through one of its representa-
tives, entered into negotiations looking toward such object, assum-
ing such negotiations to be illegal, it could never legally complete
the deal, either in this state after it secured a permit, or elsewhere
without one.43
The new law removes this impediment by expressly providing in section
25503, governing civil liability that,
No person shall be liable under this section if the sale of the se-
curity is qualified prior to the payment or receipt of any part of
the consideration for the security sold, even though an offer to sell
or a contract of sale may have been made or entered into without
qualification.44
Professor Loss has noted that the holding in Robbins has been distin-
guished in a number of California cases where the facts show an overt
attempt to evade California law."" It would appear that modernly the
need to resort to finding evasion would be eliminated by the express
provisions in section 25008 dealing with jurisdiction. The court in
Robbins said the result would have been obvious if the buyers had them-
selves gone to New York to complete the deal. Can the California law
be circumvented by soliciting the buyers to travel to Nevada to complete
a sale? Marsh and Volk note that the definition of offer in subdivision
(b) of section 20517 which includes any attempt to dispose of (or so-
licitation of an offer to buy) a security was intended to and will preclude
any evasion of the qualification requirements of the statute by the act
of the seller in inducing the buyer's to leave the state to complete the
sale.46 Therefore, any discussions regarding the proposed transac-
43. 8 Cal. 2d at 278.
44. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25503.
45. Loss, supra note 22, at 236.
46. MARsH & VOLES at 98-99.
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fion which may have progressed to the point where the parties are
ready to travel in Nevada for the purpose of consummating the trans-
action will almost inevitably have involved an offer in this state.
Of course, it is also clear that a promoter cannot avoid application of
the California statute by making sales in Nevada to persons solicited pur-
suant to the exemption in section 25102(a) regarding offers not made
to the public. The nonpublic offering exemption of section 25102(a)
merely postpones the time for qualification and does not affect juris-
diction so that the sale, wherever concluded, is "in this state" if the of-
fer is directed to this state or originates from this state even though ex-
empt from qualification at that point. This is obvious but may be over-
looked by one predisposed to find an exemption for his client.
Exemptions-Commercial Paper
Certain exemptions from the requirement of qualification are added
by the new law and others which are carried over from the prior statute
are significantly modified. Since a detailed discussion of each of these
changes is beyond the scope of this article, consideration will be limited
to one of the new sections which apparently has not been clearly under-
stood, and to the close-corporation exemption which is treated in the
next section.
Section 25100(l) of the new law provides an exemption from qual-
ification under either section 25110, 25120 or 25130 for
Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have
been or are to be used for current transactions and which evi-
dences an obligation to pay cash within nine months of the date of
issuance, exclusive of days of grace ...
This section, like its counterpart in the Uniform Securities Act,4" is
based upon and is substantially similar to section 3(a)(3) of the Fed-
eral Securities Act of 1933.48 A clause has been added to the Cali-
fornia version, however, which excepts from the exemption ". . . such
promissory notes offered to the public in amounts of less than five thou-
sand dollars ($5,000) in the aggregate to any one purchaser."49
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) interpreted the
federal exemption for "commercial paper" in a 1961 opinion.50 The
47. UNIFOam ScuRrris AcT § 402(a)(10).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(3).
49. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25100(1).
50. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4412 (1961). 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
2045.
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SEC discussed the legislative history of section 3(a)(3), the federal ex-
emption clause, and noted that the House Report on the Act (Securi-
ties Act of 1933) stated: "Paragraph (3) exempts short term paper of
the type available for discount at a Federal Reserve bank and of a type
which is rarely bought by private investors."51 The SEC report con-
cludes that the legislative history of the Act makes clear that section 3-
(a)(3) applies only to
prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordinarily
purchased by the general public, that is, paper issued to facilitate
well recognized types of current operational business requirements
and of a type eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve
banks." 5
2
Also, the opinion interprets the nine-month maturity requirement as
prohibiting obligations payable on demand as well as obligations with
provisions for automatic "roll over." 53
In this same opinion the SEC refers to Regulation A of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System which governs advances
and discounts by Federal Reserve banks. Subsection (a) of sec-
tion 3 of this regulation provides that the paper, to be acceptable
for discount, must not be a note, draft, or bill of exchange the pro-
ceeds of which have been used, or are to be used for permanent or
fixed improvements of any kind, such as land, buildings or mach-
inery, or for any other fixed capital purpose.54 The SEC has added
that the exemption is not allowed where the proceeds are to be used
for the discharge of existing indebtedness, unless such indebtedness
is itself exempt under section 3(a)(3); for the purchase or construc-
tion of a plant, durable machinery or equipment; the funding of com-
mercial real estate development or financing; the purchase of real es-
tate mortgages or other securities; the financing of mobile homes or
home improvements; or the purchase or establishment of a business en-
terprise.55 The California Commissioner of Corporations has also in-
terpreted section 25100(l) as being applicable only to prime quality
negotiable commercial paper available for discount by a Federal Re-
serve bank and has advised in an interpretative opinion that the exemp-
tion is not available for the sale of nontransferable notes as such paper
would not meet the requirement of negotiability. Since the California
section is substantially identical to the federal, the interpretation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission should at least be of some weight
51. Id. at 2556.
52. Id. at 2555.
53. Id. at 2556.
54. 12 CFR § 201.3(a)(2).
55. Release No. 33-4412, supra note 46.
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in future interpretations of section 25100(l) either by a court or the
Commissioner.
The Securities and Exchange Commission notes that what is a cur-
rent transaction is a question of fact to be considered in light of the par-
ticular facts and business practices surrounding individual cases. The
SEC indicates that a type of paper which would fall within the terms of
section 3(a)(3) is a short-term paper issued by finance companies to
carry their installment loans.56  Professor Loss points out that some of
the large finance companies do offer nine-month paper to the public
from time to time in reliance on section 3(a) (3) of the Federal Act. 57
It would appear in fact that the requirement that the paper be "prime
quality negotiable commercial paper eligible for discount by a Federal
Reserve bank" would limit its availability to very substantial, well-
capitalized companies. It also seems clear that a financial worth test
must be read into this exemption. Section 4 of Regulation A of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, which relates to
the general requirements for advances and discounts, provides in sub-
section (b) that in order to determine whether paper offered for dis-
count is eligible and acceptable, any Federal Reserve bank may require
that there be filed with it statements which
adequately reflect the financial worth of one or more parties to
any note, draft or bill of exchange offered for discount and of
any corporations or firms affiliated with or subsidiary to such party
or parties. 58
Even though an offer or sale of notes may be found to be exempt from
qualification in California under section 25100(l) it should be noted
that such sales are not exempt from sections 25401 and 25402. These
latter sections provide for civil liability and criminal penalties for mis-
representation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
The Commissioner's rules for determining whether a sale of debt securi-
ties to the public would be fair may be helpful in considering whether a
transaction, even though not subject to the requirement of qualifica-
tion, may be unfair or involve misrepresentations. The Commissioner's
rule 140.9 would ordinarily prohibit the sale by a nonseasoned com-
pany of nonconvertible debt securities to the public.59 The philosophy
underlying this rule is that it would be a misrepresentation for a new
56. Id.
57. I Loss, SEcuRIES R . ArION 567 (2d ed. 1961).
58. 12 CFR § 201.4(b).
59. Commissioner's rule [hereinafter referred to as "Rule'] 260.001(f) providesthat,
a 'seasoned corporation' ordinarily means an issuer which has been con-
ducting bona fide business operations, either directly or through a predeces-
sor, for more than two years, and has operated at a profit during at least
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company without an earnings history to promise that it can meet a fixed
interest payment or in fact even repay principal. Also, Rule 140.10, re-
lating to capital structure of seasoned corporations, provides that a sea-
soned corporation proposing to sell senior securities which are nonpar-
ticipating and nonconvertible must show its ability to meet the proposed
dividend, interest and sinking fund requirements on all of its senior secu-
rities outstanding and proposed to be issued based upon its previous
earnings or cash flow history or upon its demonstrated future earning or
cash flow capacity. This rule is also based upon the proposition that it
would be unfair and in fact may involve a misrepresentation to sell a
debt security promising a fixed rate of interest where the issuer does not
have a sufficient earnings record to demonstrate ability to meet the
payments of both interest and principal. These rules, of course, pro-
vide only minimum standards and do not attempt to cover the question
of the nature of the disclosure which may be required in a particular
case.
Promissory notes or commercial paper, to meet the requirements of
the exemption in section 25100(l), must be short term. Therefore,
because of the very nature of the note that is subject to the exemption, it
may be difficult for a relatively small company, even though seasoned,
to show its ability to repay the obligation when due in nine months. It
appears clear that the exemption provided by section 25100(l) is in-
tended for those substantial companies which have adequate capital
or established sources of capital to refund the indebtedness created by
their issue. An example would be those finance companies whose se-
curities are traded in the market, which regularly sell securities on the
public market and which would therefore have a somewhat reliable
source of new capital. In any event, it should be evident that the exemp-
tion is very limited and counsel should obtain an interpretive opinion
from the Commissioner if there is any doubt that the securities to be sold
are not clearly within the express terms and the intent of the section.
Furthermore, even if it is determined that the exemption applies and
that qualification is not required, the problem of misrepresentation
and liability under sections 25401 and 25402 cannot be overlooked.
The Close-Corporation Exemption
The close-corporation or "small issue" exemption created by section
25102(h) of the new law will have the greatest impact in terms of num-
one of the last three fiscal years.
Cal. Admin. Code, Title 10, § 260.001(f). The Commissioner's regulations relating
to the Corporate Securities Law are preceded by the number 260. For convenience
only the rule numbers following the 260 prefix will be cited and all references to the
rules will be to Title 10 of the California Administrative Code.
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bers of issues exempted. Securities laws of most states provide some
form of "small issue" or "limited offering" exemption; however, the
California provision is the most restrictive.10 In the first place, the
California exemption applies only to the offer or sale of voting common
stock by a California corporation. Second, it must be clear that im-
mediately after the sale and issuance there will be only one class of stock
of such corporation outstanding which is owned beneficially by no more
than five persons. As do the statutes in a number of other states, the
section prohibits the publication of any advertising or the payment or
incurring of any selling expense or promotional consideration in con-
nection with the offer, sale or issuance of the stock. 1 Thus although
the number of offers is not limited, the section precludes an offering to
the public by use of advertisement and the ultimate sale can be made to
only five persons, or in-theory, as many as ten persons when spouses
are included since shares held by a husband and wife are considered as
held by one.62
There are three additional requirements framed with the intent of
limiting this exemption to those transactions which do not, on balance,
warrant the application of the regulatory provisions of the Corporate
Securities Law. Possibly the most significant is subsection (3) of sec-
tion 25103 which limits the consideration for which shares may be
issued under the exemption to:
(i) only assets (which may include cash) of an existing business
enterprise transferred to the issuer upon its initial organization, of
which all of the persons who are to receive the stock to be issued
pursuant to this exemption were owners during, and such enter-
prise was operated for, a period of not less than one year immedi-
ately preceding the proposed issuance, and the ownership of such
enterprise immediately prior to such proposed issuance was in the
same proportions as the shares of stock are to be issued, or (ii)
only cash or cancellation of indebtedness for money borrowed or
both upon the initial organization of the issuer, provided all such
stock is issued for the same price per share, or (iii) only cash, pro-
vided the sale is approved in writing by each of the existing share-
holders and the purchaser or purchasers are existing shareholders,
or (iv) in a case where after the proposed issuance there will be
only one owner of the stock of the issuer, any legal consideration.63
By so restricting the nature of the consideration, the draftsmen at-
tempted to insure that the price paid by each shareholder would be
60. IV Loss, SECURITIES REGuLATION, 2638 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).
61. Id. at 2634-2641.
62. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25102(h) (5).
63. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25102(h) (3).
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equal and that there would be no dilution of the interests of shareholders.
Once a corporation has issued shares, whether pursuant to a permit or to
this exemption, it cannot utilize the exemption to sell shares to new in-
vestors even though after the sale the shareholders will not exceed five.
Also, if shares are already owned by more than one person, the ex-
emption can only be used to sell shares for cash to the existing share-
holders.
Secondly, subsection (5)14 requires that there be filed or mailed for
filing with the Commissioner not later than the day on which the securi-
ties are issued, a notice on a form prescribed by the Commissioner which
contains specified information including an opinion signed by an active
member of the State Bar of California to the effect that, on the basis of
the facts stated in the notice, it is his opinion that the exemption is avail-
able for the proposed offer and sale of securities. As Marsh and Volk
point out,
The theory behind this requirement of an opinion of counsel was
that the involvement of an attorney in the transaction would not
only tend to avoid the abuse of the exemption by persons who
deliberately attempt to claim it when it is inapplicable, but also
would reduce the possibility of the forfeiture of the exemption by
an accidental failure to meet all of the conditions. .... 65
Last, but definitely not the least significant of the restrictions on the
availability of this exemption, is the requirement set forth in subsection
(1) of section 25102(h) that:
All such stock shall be evidenced by certificates which shall have
stamped or printed prominently on their face a legend in a form to
be prescribed by rule of the commissioner restricting transfer of such
stock in such manner as the rule provides.
The rule adopted pursuant to this subsection is 102.6,60 which requires
that the shares issued pursuant to this exemption include the same re-
strictions on transfer as imposed by the Commissioner in respect to
qualifications for the sale of securities to a limited class where an open
sale to the public cannot be found to be fair, just and equitable.
Has section 25102(h) or its implementing rules been changed or
interpreted so as to substantially broaden or limit its application? Only
one of the technical amendments to the Corporate Securities Law of
1968 enacted by the legislature in 1969 and 1970 related to section
25102(h) and the change made was nonsubstantive 7
64. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h)(5).
65. MARSH & VOLK at 119.
66. Rule 102.6.
67. CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 612, § 2, p. 1192, amending CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25102
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Several rules promulgated upon enactment apply to section 25102(h).
However, the only rule passed subsequent to the enactment of the
law having a direct affect on the section is Rule 102.5, providing
that for the purposes of section 25102(h) securities held by a part-
nership or joint venture shall be considered to be owned beneficially by
each of its partners or joint venturers, and securities held by a trustee
shall be considered to be owned beneficially by each of the beneficiaries,
present, future and contingent, of the trust (with certain stated excep-
tions). This section recognizes the legal principle that such organiza-
tions are not separate legal entities.68 Its intent is to preclude the pyra-
miding of the number of ultimate sales that could be effected under sec-
tion 25102(h) by selling, for instance, to partnerships which may have
sold interests without qualification under the nonpublic offering exemp-
tion of section 25102(f) available for partnership and joint venture in-
terests.
Because of the very wide impact of section 25102(h) there have
been numerous requests for interpretive opinions. Most of these have
been answered by reference to the express language of the section.
This provision was carefully drawn and leaves little room for expansion
without amendments to the statute.
One ambiguous reference appears in clause (ii) of subsection (3)69
which limits the consideration that may be received to "cash or can-
cellation of indebtedness for money borrowed or both upon the initial
organization of the issuer provided all such stock is issued for the same
price per share." The words "initial organization" have been interpreted
to mean initial stock issuance and not initial incorporation.70 This will
allow use of the exemption where, for instance, upon incorporation or
sometime thereafter two incorporators, A and B, have advanced some
part or all of the cash required in the business and commenced opera-
tions. Shares can be issued pursuant to the exemption in cancellation
of the indebtedness despite the time lag between incorporation and
(h) (5). The last paragraph of this subsection prohibits the use of section 25102(h)
by several corporations to pyramid the ultimate number of issuees and as initially en-
acted provided that shares issued under the exemption to a corporation which itself
had issued stock pursuant to the exemption must be considered to be held "by its share-
holders." As amended the subsection requires that only those to whom shares were
issued pursuant to the exemption be counted. Thus if corporation A proposes to
issue shares pursuant to the exemption to corporation B which itself had issued shares
to five persons pursuant to the exemption but later to ten additional persons pursuant
to a qualification, only five are counted in determining the beneficial owners of the
shares of A immediately after issuance.
68. Generally, a partnership is not recognized as a separate entity from its mem-
bers although a separate entity theory has been applied for purposes of various statutes.
3 WrrmN, SumImAY oF CAL F RNA LAw 2268 (7th ed. 1960).
69. CAL. Con,. CODE § 25102 (h) (3)(ii).
70. M~AsH & VOLK at 115.
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share issuance (assuming the exemption is otherwise complied with).
Under the new law this lag should not be as prevalent since the close-
corporation exemption should substantially eliminate delays previously
experienced in respect to filing for or obtaining qualification of a securi-
ties issuance.
The words "initial organization" have been interpreted, however, to
preclude the exemption in the case where cash advances were made by
the incorporators, A and B, upon incorporation and sometime there-
after by a third party, C, even though only a few months later. This in-
terpretation is supported by the rationale of the exemption that the con-
sideration paid by each investor must be of the same quality. In the in-
terval before C makes his investment, the business may have deteriorated
so that a sale to him at the same price or otherwise on the same terms
may be unfair.
Clause (i) of subsection (3)71 in effect allows the use of this exemp-
tion where the consideration will consist of the assets of a partnership if
all of the proposed issuees have been owners of the partnership during,
and the partnership has been operating for, a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the proposed issuance. In addition, the
shares must be issued in the same proportion as the ownership of the
partnership immediately prior to the issuance. The philosophy of this
restriction is that any fraud in the formation of the partnership should
have come to light within the year of operation. The requirement that
each person receive shares in the same proportion as his ownership in
the partnership assets should assure that the investments made by each
would be of the same quality. The Commissioner has construed this
section to mean that each proposed issuee must have been a partner for
the entire year immediately preceding issuance, so that the exemption
may not be availed of if a third partner, C, has been admitted to the
partnership at any time within the year. Also, the exemption does not
apply if shares are proposed to be issued for the assets of two business
enterprises. The clause does not preclude the exemption, however, in
the case where one partner has withdrawn within the year preceding
the issuance.
Marsh and Volk point out in their discussion of this exemption that
transfers of stock effected immediately after issuance and issued pursu-
ant to the exemption, whether pursuant to a consent obtained from the
Commissioner, or pursuant to one of the exemptions to the requirement
of a consent order, should not result in forfeiture of the exemption by
71. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25102(h)(3)(i).
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virtue of the "step transaction" doctrine. 72 The authors note that the
words "immediately after" were inserted in the introductory portion of
section 25102(h) to make this clear. This brief reference in Marsh
and Volk has not been expanded upon or qualified but perhaps should
be. As previously noted, this exemption is for a particular transaction
and if subsequent transfers of stock, even though occurring shortly
after the initial issuance, are in fact separate transactions, there should
be no reason for disqualifying the exemption despite the fact that such
transfers may increase the number of shareholders to more than five.
Unlike the exemption provided at section 25102(i) for sales to in-
stitutional investors, the close-corporation exemption does not require
that the initial investors represent that the shares are being purchased for
investment and not for resale. In lieu of this requirement the section
subjects the shares issued to a restriction on transfer, giving the Com-
missioner authority to police transfers of shares issued pursuant to the
exemption. However, it should be noted that if there will be more
than one beneficial owner after issuance, subsection (4) of section
25102(h) prohibits the payment of any promotional consideration.
Further, this prohibition is applicable not only against the issuance of
stock for promotional consideration but against the payment or incur-
ring of any promotional consideration in cash, stock or otherwise.
Therefore, the prohibition cannot be avoided by selling stock to three
issuees for cash and thereafter buying a business or assets from one of
them at a price in excess of their value which includes payment for pro-
motion.
Section 25151 gives the Commissioner authority to deny a request
for consent to transfer securities which are subject to a legend condi-
tion imposed by section 25102(h) (1) if he finds that the proposed
transfer will not be fair, just or equitable to the proposed transferees.
The application form for consent to transfer adopted under section
25151 requires substantially more information or at least more relevant
information than was required for such transfers under the prior law. 3
For instance, unless the application reflects that the proposed trans-
feree will be either an officer or director or will actively participate at
least on a part time basis in the issuer's business, the form requires addi-
tional information as to the relationship of the transferee to the issuer
or to its officers or directors as well as information relating to the invest-
ment experience of the transferee and the size of this investment in re-
spect to the transferee's net worth or annual income. Because of the
72. MARsH & VoLE at 110.
73. For a statement of the information required in an application for consent
to transfer see Rule 151, CAL. ADMIN. CODE, Title 10.
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limitations on the nature of the consideration for which shares may be
issued and the authority of the Commissioner to review transfers, use
of the close-corporation exemption should not result in significantly less
review by the Commissioner than under the prior law.
Clause (3) (iv) of section 25102(h), 75 however, permits the issuance
of shares for any legal consideration where there will be only one is-
suee. The Commissioner has interpreted the words "any legal consid-
eration" in this clause as allowing the issuance of shares for promotional
consideration, so that the general prohibition in subsection (4) against
promotional consideration does not apply in the case where there is only
one issuee. It is possible under this clause for a promoter to set up a
corporation, take stock under this exemption for substantial promo-
tional consideration, and thereafter transfer to other purchasers with-
out being subject to Commissioner's rules both as to amount of pro-
motional shares that may be issued and as to waivers of rules regarding
assets and dividends? In this situation the step transaction poses a
greater problem. An intentional abuse of the exemption may, of course,
result in a finding by either the Commissioner or a court upon suit by
shareholders that the exemption was not properly claimed. If, for in-
stance, the promoter files a notice under the exemption in which he
represents that there will only be one issuee of the stock but prior to such
filing he has agreed to resell shares to others, the notice will be ma-
terially defective and the exemption not properly taken. What if at the
time of filing the promoter has not actually agreed to sell to others but
has formed an intent to resell either to people he has in mind or to the
first buyers he can locate? Could a court find that his resales were as an
underwriter on behalf of the issuer? The term underwriter is defined in
the Federal Securities Act in the board sense to include anyone who buys
with a view to distribution. 6 "Underwriter" is defined in the more re-
strictive sense under the California law as one who agrees either to pur-
chase securities for distribution or to distribute or manage a distribution
of securities on behalf of the issuer.77 Although section 25022 does not
specifically provide that the agreement need be express, it would prob-
ably be tenuous to argue that by purchasing with an intention to resell
the promoter has agreed with the issuer to sell. In at least one case
under the prior law a California court found by application of the "alter
ego" doctrine that resales by promoters of a corporation who, at the ini-
74. Under the prior law permits subject to a legend condition were normally
issued upon little information where sales were to a very limited number and where
there were no promotional considerations.
75. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h)(3)(iv).
76. SEcTuTIEs Acv OF 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1933).
77. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25022.
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tiation of such sales, were the owners of substantially all of its shares,
were sales on behalf of the issuer.78  In that case, however, quite clearly
the corporation was a mere sham, organized to facilitate theft by the
promoters. In other cases under the prior law the alter ego doctrine was
referred to by the court to support its finding that resales by a promoter
and sole shareholder were on behalf of the issuer or were otherwise is-
suer transactions.
79
The facts in each of these cases would have supported a finding un-
der either the prior law or the new law that the sales constituted issuer
transactions because the proceeds were paid directly or indirectly to the
issuer. Also, in most of these cases the courts were applying section
251520 of the prior law which required a permit for those resales of
outstanding shares that were "on behalf of the issuer"; a phrase which
offers more latitude in definition than "agreed with." It cannot be
said with certainty, however, that a court, in applying the statute to a
situation that has elements of evasion, would not apply a broader defi-
nition of "underwriter" than set forth in section 25022 of the new law.
If resales by the promoter and initial issuee are for the direct benefit
of the issuer such sales will themselves be subject to qualification as an
issuer transaction. Issuer transaction is not defined in the statute;
however, "nonissuer transaction" is defined at section 25011 as any
transaction not directly or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer. By
negative implication, an issuer transaction is directly or indirectly for
the benefit of the issuer. Section 25011 also provides that a transac-
tion is indirectly for the benefit of the issuer if any portion of the pur-
chase price of any of the securities involved in the transaction will be re-
ceived indirectly by the issuer. Thus, if the promoter sells a portion of
his outstanding shares and loans any part of the proceeds to the issuer,
it is likely that a court would find the sale of the outstanding shares was
not an exempt nonissuer transaction but subject to qualification as an
issuer transaction.8'
78. People v. Allen, 47 Cal. App. 2d 735 (1941).
79. See Pyle v. Shipman, 251 Cal. App. 2d 913 (1967); People v. Mills, 148
Cal. App. 2d 392 (1957); People v. Mason, 184 Cal. App. 2d 317 (1960), and cases
cited in People v. Allen, 47 Cal. App. 2d 735. See also Conrad v. Superior Ct., 209
Cal. App. 2d 143 (1962) which distinguishes Mason, Mills and prior cases.
80. CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 384, § 1, p. 702.
81. See People v. Mason, 184 Cal. App. 2d 317, 372 (1960) holding that the
trial court properly refused to give an instruction that,
there is no illegality in making of a loan by a stockholder to a corporation,
even if the funds so loaned are the proceeds of a sale of the personally
owned stock of said stockholder.
The Commissioner has relied on an opinion of the Attorney General dated April 5,
1968, to the effect that an issuer transaction is involved where an individual sells
personally owned stock and loans the proceeds to the issuer. 51 Op. CAL. Ai'T'Y
GEN. 40 (1968).
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What if the promoter borrows money and issues shares to himself
for cash and promotional services and then resells a portion of his shares
for cash to repay the loan? This case is not so clear; however, it would
seem a court could reach the same conclusion if the transactions were all
part of a plan of initial financing. Probably the best assurance against
abuse of the exemption is the Commissioner's review of subsequent
transfers. The grant of authority in section 25151 appears broad
enough to authorize the Commissioner to require a detailed statement
of the facts relating to the initial issuance in those cases where shares
have been issued to only one issuee and are proposed to be transferred
to others immediately after issuance or otherwise. In fact, it is the pol-
icy of the State Department of Corporations, in reviewing transfers, to
make an initial determination of whether the transfer relates to shares
issued pursuant to the exemption and, if so, whether the shares were
initially issued to one issuee. In these cases, since there is no way to
determine from the face of the exemption notice filed under section
25102(h) whether shares have been issued for promotion, the Com-
missioner ordinarily will require financial statements and other infor-
mation to determine how much promotional stock, if any, has been is-
sued.8 2 He may then refuse consent to the transfer unless the promoter
agrees to subordinate his right to assets and dividends in respect to pro-
motional shares in the manner required by the Commissioner's rules, or
unless the promoter demonstrates that the purchaser is sophisticated
and knows of the promotional shares outstanding and of their potential
dilution of other shares.
Civil Liability-Rescission and Repurchase Offers
The new law contains detailed provisions relating to civil liabilities,
reflecting another significant change from the prior statute. Sections
25400, 25401 and 25402 prohibit certain conduct, including market
manipulation (section 25400), misrepresentation by way of false or
misleading statements or omissions (section 25401), and nondisclosure
of material information in connection with the purchase or sale of se-
curities by insiders (section 25402). These sections, which are new to
California securities law, are modeled after the Federal Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, with certain sig-
nificant modifications.8" Liability for violation of these sections is cre-
ated by sections 25500, 25501 and 25502 providing a specific remedy
82. These procedures will be complied with unless information in the application
for consent to transfer is sufficient to determine that the transaction will be fair.
83. Draftsmen's Commentary, MARSH & VoLK Appendix A at 650-651.
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to the buyer or the seller as the case may be and for a specific measure
of damages where damages are available as a remedy. Section 25506
establishes a statute of limitations applicable to violations of sections
25500, 25501 and 25502. Section 25503 provides liability for viola-
tions of the qualification provisions of sections 25110, 25120 and
25130. The state of limitations applicable to violations of the quali-
fication sections is set out in section 25507(a). Other sections relate
to indemnification and contribution and the liability of certain principals,
control persons, and of employees and brokers or agents who ma-
terially aid in acts or transactions constituting a violation of sections
25501 or 25503.
In contrast, the prior law contained essentially one provision relating
to civil liabilities, section 26100.84 It provided that every security "sold
or issued" without a permit or in nonconformity with any provision of a
permit of the Commissioner is void. That law did not expressly provide
either for a right of rescission in the buyer or for damages or a statute of
limitations. Section 25518 was added to the statute in 1967, allowing
the Commissioner to issue a curative permit to authorize the issuance
and sale of any security previously issued or sold without a permit or in
nonconformity with a permit previously obtained. 85 Prior to 1967 the
statute did not contain an express provision allowing the issuer of a void
security to terminate its liability by obtaining a permit or otherwise. Al-
though the securities laws of many states include provisions making sales
in violation of the statute void or voidable, the California statute was
unique in providing that the security itself was void.8 " California courts,
however, interpreted section 26100 to mean that securities sold in viola-
tion of the law were voidable at the election of the buyer and not void
for all purposes.87  The courts also worked out details of the buyer's
remedy and of the seller's defenses. The latter were essentially limited
to the claim that the buyer was in pari delicto.88
The counterpart in the new law to old section 26100 is section 25503.
This section does not make either a sale made in violation of the law or
the securities sold in violation of the law void or voidable but instead
gives the buyer the right to bring an action for rescission against any per-
son who violates the qualification provisions of the Act. 9 If the buyer
84. CAL. STATS. 1949, c. 384, § 1, p. 720.
85. CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1120, §§ 1.5-4, p. 2781.
86. I Loss, SEcURiTiES REGULATION, 1634 (2d ed. 1961).
87. See Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability under the California Cor-
porate Securities Act: 111, 34 CAYiF. L. RPv. 543 (1946).
88. m Loss, supra note 86, at 1631-1643.
89. The action in rescission allows the successful plaintiff to recover the con-
sideration paid for the security with interest at the legal rate, less income received on
the security, upon tender of the security.
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no longer owns the security he is entitled to damages. Section 25507(a)
provides that the statute of limitations applicable to liability under sec-
tion 25503 is two years from the violation or one year after discovery of
the violation by plaintiff, whichever occurs first.
However, subsection (b) of section 25507 provides the seller with a
procedure for terminating his liability in a much shorter period. Un-
der this subsection, the seller may make an offer to repurchase the se-
curity for cash; or to pay damages in an amount recoverable by the
buyer under section 25503; or to rescind the transaction by putting the
parties back in the same position as before the transaction. If, before
suit is commenced, the buyer has received an offer pursuant to this
subsection, he is barred from commencing an action for rescission or
damages under section 25503 unless he accepts the offer within the
period specified by the seller (which may not be less than 30 days).
However, the repurchase offer, which is required to be in writing, must
be approved as to form by the Commissioner; it must state the manner
in which liability under section 25503 may have arisen; it must set forth
the provisions of subdivision (b), and must contain such other infor-
mation as the Commissioner may require by rule or order. This subdi-
vision of section 25507, as well as the statute of limitations in subdivi-
sion (a), was modeled after section 410(e) of the draft Uniform Se-
curities Act which has been adopted by a number of other states. 0 As
it appears in the California statute, however, the section reflects modi-
fications of the Uniform Act, the most significant being the requirement
that the repurchase offer under section 25507(b) be approved as to
form by the Commissioner and contain such other information as the
Commissioner may, by rule or order, require.91
There are, as yet, no California appellate cases interpreting either
section 25503 or 25507. Some of the questions raised by these sections
will not be clarified until litigated. Nevertheless, a number of conclusions
can be drawn from the overall purpose and intent of the civil liability
sections of the statute. It seems quite clear that a seller cannot assert
the buyer's failure to accept a repurchase offer not made in compliance
with section 25507(b) as a bar to an action by the buyer.02 Also, even
if the buyer has, by agreement, purportedly waived a right of rescission,
or specifically rejected the seller's repurchase offer made without refer-
ence to or compliance with section 25507(b), the seller cannot assert the
90. Draftsmen's Commentary, MARSH & Voix, Appendix A at 654-657.
91. Id. at 657.
92. See Schlossberg v. Chicago Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 350 Ill. App. 166, 112
N.E.2d 173 (1953).
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statute as a bar to a later action by the buyer, but must plead the waiver
and rely on principles of contract or estoppel to bar the buyer's suit.
Is a repurchase offer under section 25507(b) the only method of
terminating the seller's liability prior to the expiration of the two-year
statute of limitations? Subsection (b) is intended as a special remedy to
the seller who, without some way of "curing" a sale in violation of the
statute, is subject to the uncertainty of contingent liabilities until the
two-year limitations period has expired. If the seller does not seek the
benefit of the subsection-forcing the buyer either to affirm the sale
or accept recission within the 30-day period-arguably he can still
solicit a binding affirmance by the buyer without complying with sec-
tion 25507(b). The law is not clear, however, as to the effect of a pur-
ported waiver by the buyer of the statutory right of rescission under ei-
ther state or federal securities law. There are many cases dealing with
laches and estoppel but few dealing directly with the question whether
an agreement between the seller and purchasers where the purchaser
waives his right of rescission will preclude a later suit by the purchaser.9"
Generally courts have been reluctant to apply the doctrine of estoppel
to bar recovery by the buyer. This has been especially true in Cali-
fornia where, under the prior law, a security sold in violation of the
statute was voidY4 Some opinions, however, have suggested in the ap-
propriate case the buyer's suit may be barred by the defense of waiver.95
There are some obstacles which would make rescission offers effected
outside of section 25507(b) unreliable as a defense. In denying the
seller's defense that the buyer is estopped, courts have frequently re-
ferred to the strong public policy of securities regulation which favors
protecting the buyer.9 Professor Louis Loss suggests that anti-waiver
provisions, such as Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, should aid a
buyer asserting a violation as against any arguments directed by his ad-
versary to ratification or estoppel as well as waiver. 9 7 The Corporate
Securities Law of 1968 includes an anti-waiver provision in substanti-
ally the same language as that in the federal statute.98 Cases that have
93. See III Loss, supra note 86, at 1677, and Dahlquist, supra note 87, at 700,
citing cases (mostly under the prior California law) dealing with ratification, estoppel
and laches.
94. See III Loss, supra note 86, at 1677-1680. See also N. C. Roberts Co. v.
Topaz Transformer Products, Inc,. 239 Cal. App. 2d 801 (1966), and cases citedtherein.
95. See Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (1964). See also Note,
Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the
Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5: Deterrence and Equity in Balance, 73 YALE
L.J. 1477 (1964), for a discussion of estoppel and waiver under federal and state
securities laws and for a list of cases relating to estoppel and waiver.
96. See, e.g., Randall v. California Land Buyers Syndicate, 217 Cal. 594 (1933).
97. m Loss, supra note 79, at 1815.
98. CAL. CoRe. CODB § 25701.
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arisen under the 1933 Act interpreting Section 14 suggest that although
the section probihits the solicitation of a waiver at the time of sale, it
would not preclude waivers after the right has arisen. 9 There is dictum
in one case applying the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to the ef-
fect that a knowledgeable waiver by the buyer executed after the lia-
bility has arisen may be binding.100
The courts may find less trouble with a bona fide settlement between
a seller and a buyer who has filed a lawsuit and is represented by coun-
sel, but a rescission offer initiated by the seller and made to ordinary in-
vestors who may not be represented by counsel presents a more diffi-
cult question. Section 25507(b) requires that a repurchase offer un-
der that section state the respect in which liability under the section may
have arisen and it would seem that courts would demand that rescission
offers made outside of the section, if they are to be binding, clearly ap-
prise the buyer of the nature of the liability and of his remedy.' 0' The
courts may go further and require disclosure of material information
about the security and the condition of the issuer which may be neces-
sary if the buyer is to understand the value of the right he is waiving.
In effect this is the standard set by section 25507(b), as discussed later
herein, which authorizes the Commissioner to require disclosure of these
facts.
Would the affirmance of a sale of securities be binding on the buyer
if the seller failed to disclose in his rescission offer material information
which substantially affected the value of the security? In the first place,
the buyer's rejection of a repurchase offer made pursuant to section
25507(b) does not operate to cut off his right to sue under either sec-
tion 25501 or 25502 for damages for misrepresentations in respect to
the initial sale. Likewise, an affirmance of the sale made outside of
section 25507(b) should not have that effect unless it clearly purports
to deal with and settle the buyer's claim with respect to those violations.
A separate question is presented, however, as to whether active mis-
representation or nondisclosure of material facts concerning the condi-
tion of the issuer or other facts affecting the value of the security at the
time the recission offer is made could later be set up the buyer to
support a rescission of the agreement validating the sale. A repurchase
offer made pursuant to section 25507(b) would not appear to involve
the sale of a security subject either to qualification or to section 25501
99. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
100. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (1964).
101. In Royal Air Properties v. Smith the court said, "Since waiver is a volun-
tary act, there must be knowledge of the right in question before the act of relin-
quishment can occur." 333 F.2d at 571. The court did not say how much informa-
tion the buyer should have.
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which creates liability for misrepresentations in the sale or purchase of
securities. It would appear, therefore, that an agreement entered into
outside the provisions of section 25507(b), which is no more than a
waiver by the buyer of his right to the remedy of rescission and restitu-
tion, would not constitute the sale of a security. Consequently, section
25501 would not apply. The facts in a particular case, however, may
warrant the conclusion that a new security has been sold. If the agree-
ment, for example, alters any of the terms, including the price, of the
security initially sold, it may result either in the exchange of an entirely
new security for the outstanding security, or in an investment contract.
In any event, under common law principles, the seller's misrepresenta-
tion of material facts upon which the buyer relied should be grounds for
rescission and it is likely that a court would apply securities law stan-
dards in determining materiality."0 2
In addition to providing the seller with a statutory bar to a suit by the
buyer, repurchase offers pursuant to section 25507 (b) provide the seller
the advantage of a review by the Commissioner and disclosure of facts
which the unsophisticated seller may not have considered important.
The issuer does not have the alternative remedy under the new law of
obtaining either a formal or informal curative permit. Under the prior
law, sections 25518 through 25521,103 the Commissioner was author-
ized to issue a curative permit, and directed the courts to stay any pend-
ing civil proceeding relating to issues based on violation of the law if
the court found that there was a prima facie basis for an ultimate find-
ing by the Commissioner that issuance of the permit would be fair, just
and equitable. These sections dealing with curative permits have been
carried over into the new law but are expressly limited to transactions
occurring prior to the effective date of the new law. In addition, issuers
who wish to obtain the benefits of the alternative remedies must do so
prior to January 2, 1972, for the remedy will expire on that date as to
transactions occurring prior to January 2, 1969.104 Under the prior
law, both before and after the curative permit sections were added in
1967, it was the practice of the Commissioner to issue "informal cura-
tive" permits where a sale had occurred prior to obtaining a permit. In
these cases the applicant was required, either prior to issuance of the
permit or prior to the issuance of securities pursuant to the permit, to
make a rescission offer to the purchaser explaining the nature of the vio-
lation and his right to restitution and to submit evidence to the Com-
102. See The Relation Between Common Law Deceit and SEC Fraud Concepts,
M Loss, supra note 79, at 1430-1445, c. 9B.
103. CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1120, §§ 1.5-4, p. 2781.
104. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25800-25804.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 2
missioner of the buyer's waiver of his right of restitution. Most fre-
quently this procedure was used to cure mere technical violations where,
although a sale had occurred as defined in the statute, consideration
had not passed.
The Commissioner has interpreted the new law to preclude the is-
suance of a permit where a sale has occurred and where all or some
part of the consideration has been paid prior to qualification. The
principal argument supporting this conclusion is that section 25507(b)
provides a specific and adequate remedy to the seller. Also the new law
does not render void the security which is sold or issued without quali-
fication and there is no necessity of qualifying the securities as a pre-
requisite to rendering an opinion that they are validly issued. As a
corollary, since the statute prohibits offer and sale and not "issue", it is
clear that after a sale in violation of the statute has occurred, the issuer
can complete the transaction by issuing securities without further viola-
tion. This result produces an interesting paradox in that the issuer, who
by oversight has violated the law but who wishes to show compliance
by applying for a permit, is unable to do so unless the consideration re-
ceived from the buyer is returned and a complete rescission effected.
The issuer may then initiate the transaction once again. It may be dif-
ficult, of course, to undo the entire transaction, especially if there are a
number of buyers or if the proceeds have been applied in the business.
There are several areas where the inadvertent sale may occur and
which warrant special consideration by counsel. For instance, where
notes are issued to a closed group with an express understanding that
the notes are to be exchangeable for stock, a sale would occur whether
or not such agreement is in writing. 105 Even though the notes are is-
sued to only a few people under circumstances which would otherwise
meet the definition of a nonpublic sale under Rule 102.2, the sale will
not be exempt for the nonpublic offering exemption does not apply to
convertible notes.100
Options present another problem. Under the prior law the issuance
of an option involved an offer of the underlying security but not a sale.
There was considered to be no sale of either the underlying security or
of a security embodied in the option contract itself.10 7 Section 25019
of the new law defines security to include an option.108 Also under
section 25017 the sale of the underlying security occurs at the time of
105. People v. Whelpton, 99 Cal. App. 2d 828 (1950).
106. See CAL. AmrniN. CODE, Title 10, § 260.102.3.
107. CAL. CORP. CODE, former § 25009(c).
108. The section refers to a "warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase (a
security)."
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sale of the option; the issuance of the underlying security upon exercise
of the option is excluded from the definition of sale. Thus the issuance
of an option for value, or the payment of consideration in respect to an
agreement to issue an option involves the sale of a security which must
be qualified.
Options may be created in employment agreements without due re-
gard to the Corporate Securities Law. Whether an option has in fact
been granted or issued and whether consideration has been given for
the grant of an option is a question of fact to be determined in each
case. Arguably, however, value is given when options are granted by
the terms of an employment agreement by which an employee is in-
duced to leave existing employment and commence employment with
the issuer. The case is even stronger where the employment agreement
includes an agreement whereby the employee becomes entitled to shares
after a period of employment without the payment of additional consid-
eration. If a sale of options occurs prior to qualification a very trouble-
some question may be presented concerning what the seller must offer
to return in connection with a repurchase offer under section 25507 (b).
Civil liability does not arise under section 25503 if the sale of the
security is qualified prior to the payment or receipt of any part of the
consideration for the security sold. This is true even though an offer to
sell or a contract of sale may have been made or entered into without
qualification. Options issued without the payment of consideration ar-
guably are only offers, 109 so that qualification would be possible if made
before any consideration is paid.
Section 25102(a) provides that the execution of a subscription agree-
ment will be exempt from qualification if certain conditions are met.
To be exempt the agreement must not be offered to the public; it must
be conditioned upon qualification in the express language required by
section 251102(a); and no consideration must be received in respect to
the agreement. A subscription agreement which is not expressly condi-
tioned upon qualification would constitute a sale, being both an agree-
ment of the seller to sell and an agreement of the buyer to purchase a
security. However, the security subscribed for could be qualified as
long as the consideration has not been paid. In either of these cases,
however, it appears that as a condition to obtaining qualification the
seller should be required to advise the buyer that the contract is not en-
forceable should the buyer elect not to complete the purchase.
As indicated above, subsection (b) of section 25507 requires that
the repurchase offer be approved as to form by the Commissioner and
109. 12A W. FLETCHER, PRWVAT CORPORATONS § 5575 (penn. ed. rev. 1957).
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contain such other information as the Commissioner may require by rule
or order. Pursuant to this subsection the Commissioner has promul-
gated Rule 507 which requires that the repurchase offer include a
statement to the effect that the Commissioner has approved the of-
fer in accordance with section 25507(b) only as to its form; that the
approval does not imply a finding by the Commissioner that any state-
ments made in the offer or in any accompanying documents are true or
complete; and that the approval does not imply a finding by the Com-
missioner that the amount offered by the seller is equal to the amount
recoverable by the buyer of the security in accordance with section
25503. The rule also requires the usual caveat that the Commissioner
does not endorse the offer and makes no recommendation as to its ac-
ceptance or rejection.
In addition, the Commissioner has required, and probably should re-
quire in each case, that a repurchase offer include at least the following
information: (1) the names and addresses of all persons to whom the
offer is to be made; (2) the specific amount of cash stated as a mone-
tary sum to be offered to each person; (3) the time within which the
payment will be made if the offer is accepted; (4) sufficient informa-
tion to clearly identify the securities transaction to which the offering
relates including the name of the issuer, a specific description of the se-
curity, and the date and nature of consideration received; (5) a state-
ment clearly indicating that the buyer's right of action, if any, under
sections 25500, 25501 and 25502 is not necessarily foreclosed by a
failure to accept the offer; and (6) where it appears that the offeror
does not have sufficient funds to fund the offers proposed to be made,
a disclosure that others may be liable under the provisions of section
25504. The Commissioner has taken the position that the offer can-
not be approved as to form if it is subject to any conditions not specifi-
cally authorized by section 25507(b).
The language of subsection (b) appears sufficiently broad to author-
ize the Commissioner, in a particular case, to require, in addition to
those items above, the submission of detailed information as to the na-
ture of the business and financial condition of the issuer; information
as to the particular terms of the offering of securities which were not
qualified; and full disclosure by the offeror to the buyer of all material
facts as to the business and financial condition of the issuer, including
substantially the same kind of information as would have been required
had the sale been qualified. Moreover, the present financial condition
of the issuer as well as any material facts that may affect the present
value of the security may be required to be disclosed to the buyer. Al-
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though the Commissioner does not have authority to reject repurchase
offers made under section 25507(b) on the basis that the initial sale
or an affirmance of the contract would not be fair, just and equitable,
the "fair, just and equitable" standard, in effect, must be applied to de-
termine the nature of the disclosure that must be made to the buyer.
The information developed from this disclosure will enable the Com-
missioner to determine whether criminal action may be warranted in re-
spect to either a willful violation of the qualification sections or in re-
spect to misrepresentations which may have been made at the time of
the initial sale in violation of section 25401 or 25402. Disclosure to
the buyer will provide him with information from which he can de-
termine whether to accept the repurchase offer or to reject it and re-
tain the investment. Even if the buyer rejects the repurchase offer,
his right to sue for damages under section 25501 or 25502 is not fore-
closed and the disclosure made in respect to a repurchase offer may re-
veal to the buyer misrepresentations made in connection with the ini-
tial purchase that were in violation of these sections.
Conclusion
The Corporate Securities Law of 1968 is a carefully drafted statute
which effects a complete overhaul of the prior law. The new statute is
more explicit in many areas and eliminates many questions that had
developed over the years under the prior law. Counsel dealing with
the new securities law will, however, discover the need for a broader un-
derstanding of the law as a whole since it is much more comprehensive
and effects changes in almost every area covered by the prior statute, a
few of which have been considered here. The Department of Corpora-
tions encourages informal discussions between counsel and staff mem-
bers of the department concerning the application of the statute. Where
a question cannot be resolved by reference to the express language of
the statute or through informal discussions with staff members, counsel
may request an interpretive opinion as to the prospective applicability
of the new law to a particular transaction.
